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DISPENSING JUSTICE IN A MINORITY CONTEXT: THE JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION OF UPPER EGYPT UNDER MUSLIM RULE IN THE EARLY 
EIGHTH CENTURY 
  
 
Mathieu Tillier  
(Institut français du Proche-Orient, Beirut) 
 
 
The early Islamic judicial system can be reconstructed from narrative texts that were 
definitively fixed either during the last quarter of the ninth century or the tenth century. 
Literature specialising in judicial history such as the semi-biographical genre of akhbār al-
quḍāt assumed its definitive shape during the post-miḥna period, when the victory of Sunnism 
progressively imposed new political and institutional order. In this literature, qāḍīs appear as 
main representatives of Islamic law in a Muslim context while other religious groups remain 
underrepresented.1 However, documentary sources dating from earlier periods challenge this 
picture. Administrative papyri, originating mostly from Upper Egypt, describe judicial 
instances where provincial governors play a major role. Although these papyri paint an 
inconclusive picture of the early Islamic judicial system, they nevertheless offer illuminating 
insights about the actual judicial practice.  
In what follows, I shall examine excerpts from judicial letters of Qurra b. Sharīk, Umayyad 
governor of Egypt from 90/709 to 96/714.2 Although most of these letters were published 
decades ago, I believe they still merit a detailed contextual study within the historical 
framework of the Umayyad legal administration. The letters concern correspondence between 
Qurra and Basilios, pagarch of Aphroditō. Only letters addressed by Qurra to Basilios survive. 
Amongst the numerous papyri discovered in the early twentieth century,3 ten or so were of a 
“judiciary” nature, dealing with instructions from the governor to Basilios regarding lawsuits. 
Qurra’s letters date from the middle of the Umayyad period when Muslim people remained 
a numerical minority in the predominantly Christian Egyptian province. In Egypt, Umayyad 
governors relied on an administrative structure which can loosely be described as an extension 
                                                        
I am grateful to Robert Hoyland and Marie Legendre for their useful comments on a previous version of this 
paper. It goes without saying that remaining mistakes are mine alone. 
1 There are however some exceptions. See M. Tillier, “La société abbasside au miroir du tribunal,” Annales 
Islamologiques, 42 (2008), 166-8. 
2 On Qurra b. Šarīk, see al-Kindī, Ta’rīkh Miṣr wa-wulāti-hā, in Kitāb al-wulāt wa-kitāb al-quḍāt, éd. R. Guest 
(Leiden: Brill, 1912), 63-66; C.E. Bosworth, « Ḳurra b. Sharīk », in EI2, 5: 500; H. Lammens, “Un gouverneur 
omaiyade d’Égypte. Qorra ibn Šarîk d’après les papyrus arabes,” Bulletin de l’Institut d’Égypte, 5e série, tome II 
(1908), 99-115; N. Abbott, The Ḳurrah Papyri from Aphrodito in the Oriental Institute (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1938), 66 sq; J. b. Kh. Abū Ṣafya, Bardiyyāt Qurra b. Sharīk al-ʿAbsī. Dirāsa wa-taḥqīq (Riyad: 
Markaz al-Malik Fayṣal li-l-buḥūth wa-l-dirāsāt al-islāmiyya, 2004), 27-57. 
3 On the discovery of this collection of papyri, see H.I. Bell, “The Aphrodito Papyri,” The Journal of Hellenic 
Studies 28 (1908), 97-98; N. Abbott, The Ḳurrah Papyri from Aphrodito in the Oriental Institute (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1938), 6. Although Qurra’s judicial papyri have been known for long decades, they 
have never been the subject of any significant, detailed study. See for example E. Tyan, Histoire de l’organisation 
judiciaire en pays d’Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1938-43), I, p. 133, who dedicates only a few lines to these letters. 
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of the Byzantine system. Egyptian territory was divided into eparchies and pagarchies. Each of 
the five eparchies was ruled by a dux (ar. amīr), whose main remit was fiscal administration. 
These dux presided over the pagarchs (ar. ṣāḥib), who numbered between 50 to 60 within the 
Egyptian province. Pagarchs ruled towns and the surrounding territory.4 Although Muslims 
represented only a small minority of the population, they occupied dominant positions within 
the society. The ruling classes were not assimilated into the previous local political and social 
order. The Muslims in fact succeeded in forming a new social structure whereby the numerical 
majority – the conquered Christian population – was eventually reduced to that of a minority. 
Even though Christians represented a large majority of the Egyptian population for many 
centuries, they soon became a political minority, marginalised by their status of “protected 
people”, or what classical fiqh eventually defined as the status of dhimma.  
In this paper, I will draw on Qurra’s judicial letters to examine the judicial role played by 
Muslim authorities amongst the conquered Egyptian population. I will attempt to demonstrate 
how the numerical Christian majority was reduced to a political minority through judicial 
interventions described in documentation from the early eighth century. I shall present a 
hypothetical reconstruction of the judicial procedure described in these letters and propose 
provisional conclusions about the influence of early Islamic concepts on the development of 
the judiciary within a Christian environment.  
 
1. Why did a Muslim governor write letters to a Christian pagarch? Preliminary 
indications about early Islamic judicial procedure  
 
1.1. Typology of legal cases 
Qurra b. Sharīk’s letters concern complaints brought before him by litigants. I will first 
examine cases by type before examining the litigants’ position within the procedure. Qurra’s 
correspondence to Basilios reveals two types of cases: 
(1) Debts. Certain letters deal with complaints about a non-payment of debts. As in other 
civilisations, this situation was commonplace in early Islam to the extent that debt cases became 
paradigmatic examples of lawsuits in Islamic law. The most interesting aspect is the sums 
involved in these debt cases. The sums range from between 10 ½ dinars5 and 18 dinars claimed 
from a priest6 to 23 1/3 dinars owed by a peasant.
7 For comparative purposes, marriage contracts 
written in Egypt between the second/eighth and the fifth/eleventh centuries mention dowers 
(ṣadāqs) ranging between 2 and 10 dinars. In al-Ushmūnayn, a small house for a couple cost 4 
or 5 dinars.8 These debts were thus exceptionally high amounts, particularly given the rural or 
semi-rural environment.  
                                                        
4 C. Foss, “Egypt under Muʿāwiya. Part I: Flavius Papas and Upper Egypt,” BSOAS 72 (2009), 2-3; K. 
Morimoto, The Fiscal Administration of Egypt in the Early Islamic Period (Kyoto: Dohosha, 1981), 195-96; P. 
Sijpesteijn, “Landholding Patterns in Early Islamic Egypt,” Journal of Agrarian Change 9 (2009), 121. 
5 P.Heid.Arab. I n°3 = Abū Ṣafya n°29. 
6 P.Heid.Arab. I n°10 = Abū Ṣafya n°32. 
7 P.Cair.Arab. III n°154 = Grohmann, Arabic Papyri, 129 = Abū Ṣafya n° 28. See also P.Qurra n° 3 = Abū 
Ṣafya n°31, where more than 10 dinars are mentioned (units disappeared from the papyrus). 
8 Y. Rapoport, “Matrimonial Gifts in Early Islamic Egypt,” Islamic Law and Society 7 (2000), 14-15. 
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(2) Usurpation or misappropriation, usually by powerful people – what classical fiqh called 
ghaṣb.9 In one letter a man complains about “unfair” (ẓulman) appropriation of an unknown 
amount of money (in dinars) by someone, possibly the head of a village.10 In another papyrus, 
the plaintiff denounces the māzūt (leader) of his village, who occupies the former’s house 
through unlawful entry.11 As in the above, these disputes concern expensive goods or significant 
sums of money. 
 
1.2. The litigants 
As in conventional accusatory procedure, Qurra b. Sharīk’s letters mention two categories 
of litigants: plaintiffs and defendants. There is, however, a clear distinction in the way these 
two categories are mentioned. Plaintiffs are always nominally identified by their name (ism) 
and by the first generation of their genealogy (nasab): Ibshādah b. Abnīla,12 Marqus b. Jurayj,13 
Baqtar b. Jamūl,14 Yuḥannis b. Shanūda,15, and Dāwūd b. Baddās.16 They are all Christians and 
sons of Christians. The only exception is papyrus P.Heid.Arab. I n°11, in which the plaintiff is 
identified by pronoun “man” (someone). As the papyrus did not survive intact and the preserved 
fragment begins precisely at this point, it is possible that the plaintiff was nominally identified 
in the preceding sections.17 
On the other hand, names of defendants do not appear systematically. Most often, the 
defendant is only identified as “a peasant/peasants (nabaṭī/anbāṭ) of such a district (kūra)”.18 
Seven papyri mention litigants, but only two cite the names of defendants: Anbā Ṣalm, a 
priest,19 and M[īnā], who is most likely to be the head of a village according to Becker and Abū 
Ṣafya’s interpretation.20 We may therefore conclude that these defendants were nominally 
identified only when they were high-ranking people or notables. In another papyrus, however, 
a defendant who may well be the head of a village ([māzū]t, read [marū]t by Abū Ṣafya) is 
mentioned without being nominally identified.21 
The apparent difference in the way plaintiffs and defendants were treated may offer a clue 
regarding Islamic judicial procedures in Qurra’s time. The rare nominal identification of 
defendants could either mean that the governor did not systematically know their names, or, 
                                                        
9 See O. Spies, “Ghaṣb,” in EI2, 2: 1020. 
10 P.Heid.Arab. I n°11 = Abū Ṣafya n°33. 
11 C.H. Becker, “Arabische Papyri des Aphroditofundes,” Zeitschrift für Assyriologie 20 (1906), 74-75 = Abū 
Ṣafya n°34. To these papyri should also be added papyrus Sorbonne Inv. 2346 (published by Y. Rāġib “Lettres 
nouvelles de Qurra b. Šarīk,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 40 (1981), 183-5), although this last papyrus is very 
damaged and if it could indeed be a judiciary letter, the content has almost completely disappeared. 
12 P.Qurra n° 3 = Abū Ṣafya n°31. 
13 P.Heid.Arab. I n°3 = Abū Ṣafya n°29; P.Cair.Arab. III n°154 = Grohmann, Arabic Papyri, 129 = Abū Ṣafya 
n° 28. However, “Jurayj” disappeared from this last papyrus, and it could be a reference to someone else. If it is 
indeed the same person, this means that he brought a complaint twice in the same month, each time to ask for the 
repayment of a peasant’s debt. 
14 P.Cair.Arab. III n°155 = Abū Ṣafya n°30. 
15 P.Heid.Arab. I n°10 = Abū Ṣafya n°32. 
16 C.H. Becker, “Arabische Papyri des Aphroditofundes,” 74-75 = Abū Ṣafya n°34. 
17 P.Heid.Arab. I n°11 = Abū Ṣafya n°33. 
18 P.Cair.Arab. III n°154 = Abū Ṣafya n°28 = Grohmann, Arabic Papyri, 129; P.Heid.Arab. I n°3 = Abū Ṣafya 
n°29; P.Cair.Arab. III n°155 = Abū Ṣafya n°30; P.Qurra n°3 = Abū Ṣafya n°31.  
19 P.Heid.Arab. I n°10 = Abū Ṣafya n°32. 
20 P.Heid.Arab. I n°11 = Abū Ṣafya n°33.  
21 C.H. Becker, “Arabische Papyri des Aphroditofundes,” 74-75 = Abū Ṣafya n°34. 
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that their precise identity was of secondary importance. If both the plaintiff and the defendant 
had appeared at the governor’s court, this difference in identification would not have occurred. 
We may thus conclude that the defendant rarely made an appearance before Qurra. The 
governor was presumably more in direct contact with only the plaintiff, who was often a notable 
with sufficient material means to refer his complaint to Fusṭāṭ.22 If this hypothesis is correct, it 
provides us with an insight on the judicial procedure predating the governor’s correspondence 
with the pagarch. Absence of the defendant’s identity in the papyri and his presumed absence 
at the governor’s court indicate that the actual lawsuit did not take place. What is likely is that 
the written instructions of Qurra b. Sharīk did not concern lawsuits that he had already presided 
over but dealt with future proceedings. The governor identified the plaintiff to the pagarch 
solely for administrative reasons. The address preserved on the back of one of his letters 
(P.Qurra n°3 = Abū Ṣafya n°31) serves to confirm this hypothesis. On the second line, after the 
name of the sender and the addressee, the scribe has added the following: “with regard to 
Ibshādah b. Abnīla [and his complaint against] a peasant ([fī] Ibshādah b. Abnīla fī nabaṭ[ī])”. 
This suggests that the plaintiff’s name served as reference for the dispute, possibly for 
registration purposes of the administration.  
If these correspondences do not describe judgements of actual lawsuits but concern 
instructions of judicial proceedings, it is understandable why there was no importance attached 
to the identification of defendants. The plaintiff would conventionally be required to mention 
the identity of his adversary in lawsuits in front of the pagarch. The exception, however, was 
where the defendant was a high-ranking person not likely to be summoned to court. We may 
surmise that the identification of the defendant to the governor and the pagarch would have 
given more authority to the latter in summoning the defendant. In instances where the defendant 
was an ordinary peasant, oral identification by the plaintiff before the pagarch would have been 
sufficient.23 The conclusion therefore is that Qurra b. Sharīk’s judicial letters were most likely 
written to initiate proceedings that were presided over by a pagarch. This hypothesis is 
confirmed by some details of the procedure as reflected by Qurra’s letters. 
 
2. Judicial procedure in the presence of Qurra b. Sharīk 
 
2.1. An “appeal” to the governor? 
Qurra’s letters indicate that he had been in prior contact with the plaintiff. The nature of this 
contact remains uncertain, as the governor’s letters only make a standard mention of it with the 
expression “such and such a plaintiff informed me that (akhbara-nī anna)…”.24 The verb 
“akhbara”, which was later used in religious, historical and adab literature to indicate the 
transmission of a narrative, suggests that the plaintiff made the complaint orally: for example 
during an audience with the governor. However, Nabia Abbott has highlighted ambiguities 
                                                        
22 See P.M. Sijpesteijn, Shaping a Muslim State. The World of a Mid-Eighth-Century Egyptian Official 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 156. 
23 Regarding the identification of litigants in later periods, see M. Tillier, “L’identification en justice à l’époque 
abbasside,” Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée 127 (2010), 99-101. 
24 P.Qurra n°3 = Abū Ṣafya n°31; P.Cair.Arab. III n°154 = Abū Ṣafya n°28 = Grohmann, Arabic Papyri, 129; 
P.Heid.Arab. I n°3 = Abū Ṣafya n°29; P.Cair.Arab. III n°155 = Abū Ṣafya n°30; P.Heid.Arab. I n°10 = Abū Ṣafya 
n°32. 
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concerning the usage of this verb, particularly in the context of an isnād. Although the 
expression denotes oral transmission, it can also refer to written communication within a literate 
society.25 Since written petitions to governors began to appear in papyri documents from the 
third/ninth century onward, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that plaintiffs from the early 
eighth century may have submitted their complaints to Qurra b. Sharīk in a written form. 
The main question, however, is not how the plaintiff submitted his complaint, but rather the 
significance of this complaint to the governor and its function within the judicial process. I have 
argued in the preceding paragraphs that an encounter between the plaintiff and the governor 
may not have occurred during a lawsuit presided over by the governor. The lawsuit may well 
have taken place after the dispatch of the letter to the pagarch, which explains the prescriptive 
nature of the correspondence. What then was the course of events before the encounter? Had a 
lawsuit been raised? In other words, had the governor been solicited for proceedings that had 
already been initiated? Or did the claimant “appeal” against a decision that had already been 
issued? 
Qurra b. Sharīk’s letters do not refer to a previous lawsuit. In identifying the plaintiff, a 
recurring expression appears in the correspondence: “the [plaintiff] claims (yazʿamu) that [his 
adversary] deprived him of his right/due (anna-hu/hum ghalaba-hu/ghalabū-hu ʿalā ḥaqqi-
hi)”.26 The verb “ghalaba”, which carries the meaning “to overcome”27 could initially be 
understood as referring to a previous lawsuit in which the plaintiff had been “overcome” by his 
adversary who had unlawfully appropriated his right. This interpretation is however difficult to 
prove; it is more likely that the expression “ghalaba ʿalā ḥaqqi-hi” simply refers to the fact that 
a debtor unduly appropriated the money borrowed from the plaintiff (i.e. his due). Two extracts 
from Qurra’s letters seem to confirm this second hypothesis: 
 
(1) As to the matter in hand. Marqus b. [Jurayj] has informed me that he has to 
demand of a peasant (nabaṭī) from among the people of thy district (kūra) twenty-three 
dinars and a third of a dinar. He says that the peasant has died and that [another] peasant 
from among the people of his village has appropriated his money (i.e. that of the dead 
peasant?28), thus depriving him of his due…29 
 
(2) As to the matter in hand. Marqus b. Jurayj has informed me that a peasant from 
among the people of thy district owes him ten dinars and a half, and he claims that he 
deprived him of his due…30 
 
                                                        
25 N. Abbott, Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), II, 63.  
26 P.Cair.Arab. III n°154 = Abū Ṣafya n° 28 = Grohmann, Arabic Papyri, 129; P.Heid.Arab. I n°3 = Abū Ṣafya 
n°29; P.Cair.Arab. III n°155 = Abū Ṣafya n°30; P.Qurra n°3 = Abū Ṣafya n°31; P.Heid.Arab. I n°10 = Abū Ṣafya 
n°32. 
27 See A. de B. Kazimirski, Dictionnaire Arabe-Français (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, s.d.), II, “gh.l.b”. 
28 The ambiguity arises from the possessive pronoun “–hu” which could also refer to the creditor in “akhadha 
māla-hu”. 
29 P.Cair.Arab. III n°154 = Abū Ṣafya n° 28 = Grohmann, Arabic Papyri, 129. Translation by A. Grohmann, 
Arabic Papyri in the Egyptian Library, vol. III, Administrative Texts (Cairo: Egyptian Library Press, 1938), III, 
31-2, with revisions.  
30 P.Heid.Arab. I n°3 = Abū Ṣafya n°29. Cf. P.Qurra n°3 = Abū Ṣafya n°31; P.Heid.Arab. I n°10 = Abū Ṣafya 
n°32. 
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In the first excerpt, the plaintiff’s adversary has appropriated the debt of the dead debtor, 
possibly though inheritance, and refused to give back the money to the creditor. Likewise, in 
the second excerpt, the expression “ghalaba ʿalā ḥaqqi-hi” seems to refer to the refusal by the 
debtor to repay his debt rather than referring to a previous infringement. The expression could 
therefore be an emphatic allusion, to the harm suffered by the plaintiff who had been 
“overcome” by his adversary. 
It must be stressed that the expression “ghalaba ʿalā ḥaqqi-hi” only appears in cases 
involving debt. In cases of usurpation or misappropriation, a different expression is employed: 
“ẓulman bi-ghayri ḥaqq”. 
 
(3) Someone [came] and informed me that M[īnā, the head of his village, took from 
him the sum of … (number below 10)] dinars (dan[ā]nīr) in an unjust manner and 
without any right (ẓulman bi-ghayri [ḥaqq]).31 
 
(4) Dāwūd b. Baddās has informed me [that the māzū]t of his village settled in his 
house with members of his family and some of his belongings, in an unjust manner [and 
without any righ]t (ẓulman [bi-ghayri ḥa]qq).32 
 
This expression undoubtedly describes the wrongs committed by the defendant. It cannot 
allude to the outcome of a previous lawsuit. We can safely conclude that in cases of usurpation, 
letters to the pagarch do not contain allusions to a lawsuit that could have occurred in the 
pagarch’s court before the complaint was raised with the governor. It seems therefore 
reasonable to suppose that there were no previous lawsuits concerning usurpations, and likewise 
concerning debts. At this point, we can exclude the hypothesis that the plaintiff lodged an appeal 
before the governor of Fusṭāṭ against a judgment previously passed by the pagarch. The plaintiff 
certainly “appealed” to the governor (in a non-technical sense), perhaps by way of petition, but 
this appeal was probably part of the original trial, or proceedings in the first instance.  
 
2.2. The subject of the letters  
 
Production of proof 
If the governor did not preside over an appeal court, we still have to determine his role within 
the procedure. When Qurra b. Sharīk was called on by plaintiffs, he always sent the same type 
of instructions to the pagarch. According to the letters, it was incumbent on the pagarch to pass 
judgement on cases submitted by the plaintiff. The pagarch was sometimes ordered to summon 
both the plaintiff and the defendant (literally: “gather [the plaintiff] and his companion” ijmaʿ 
bayna-hu wa-bayna ṣāḥibi-hi) and examine their claims.33 The principal subject of the letter 
appearing time and again concerns instances where the plaintiff is required to produce proof 
(bayyina) of the legitimacy of his claim. The exact timing of the presentation of this evidence 
                                                        
31 P.Heid.Arab. I n°11 = Abū Ṣafya n°33. 
32 C.H. Becker, “Arabische Papyri des Aphroditofundes,” 74-75 = Abū Ṣafya n°34. 
33 P.Heid.Arab. I n°10 = Abū Ṣafya n°32; C.H. Becker, “Arabische Papyri des Aphroditofundes,” 74-75 = Abū 
Ṣafya n°34.  
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within a proceeding is not always mentioned.34 When it is mentioned, the presentation of proof 
seems to vary from one letter to another. In certain papyri, recovery of the truth (ḥaqq) by means 
of evidence is supposed to occur during a confrontation between the plaintiff and the defendant: 
 
Dāwūd b. Baddās has informed me [that the māzū]t of his village settled in his house 
with members of his family and some of his belongings, in an unjust manner [and 
without any righ]t. When the present letter reaches you, bring them together. If what 
[Dāwūd b. Baddās] told me is true (ḥaqqan), have [his adversary] give him back what 
he owes him.35 
 
In this excerpt, the procedure conforms to the classical fiqh model where the confrontation  
between litigants before a judge precedes the exposition of proofs.36 In other letters, however, 
the gathering of litigants follows the exposition of proofs:  
 
As to the matter in hand. Yuḥannis b. Shanūda has informed me that Anbā Ṣalm, 
belonging to his district (kūra), has a debt of eighteen dinars toward him, and that he 
deprived him of his due. If what he told me is true (ḥaqqan) and if he produces a proof 
(bayyina) of it, summon him together with his adversary and have him give back what 
he owes him.37  
 
In this type of instruction, the pagarch is ordered to preside over the production of proofs by 
the plaintiff. Only when the plaintiff’s right has been established would the defendant be 
summoned and condemned. 
The interpretation of this procedure depends on the way we consider these instructions. Two 
hypotheses may be proposed: 
(1) These letters contain clear, succinct instructions containing sentences that correspond to 
the successive steps to be implemented. The assumption is that these instructions were to be 
complied with in literal terms. In certain cases, the production of the proof by the plaintiff 
preceded his confrontation with the defendant. If the plaintiff could not prove his right before 
the pagarch, the defendant would not be summoned to court. In other cases, the pagarch is asked 
to summon the two litigants first and the plaintiff is required to produce his proof during this 
confrontation. The number of surviving judiciary papyri is too few, however, to expound further 
on this hypothesis. Could these procedures have been changed to suit the nature of the dispute 
or the litigants’ identity (especially that of the defendant)? The evidence is too scant to allow 
for a satisfactory answer. The only available consideration therefore is to allow for certain 
variability within a procedure so that the gathering of litigants before a judge is not regarded as 
a precondition to the production of the proof thereof, as in classical fiqh.38 
                                                        
34 See e.g. P.Cair.Arab. III n°154 = Abū Ṣafya n°28 = Grohmann, Arabic Papyri, 129; P.Qurra n°3 = Abū 
Ṣafya n°31. 
35 C.H. Becker, “Arabische Papyri des Aphroditofundes,” 74-75 = Abū Ṣafya n°34. 
36 On the necessary presence of the two litigants before the judge in classical Islamic law, see J. Schacht, 
Introduction au droit musulman (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1983), 157; E. Tyan, “La procédure du “défaut” 
en droit musulman,” Studia Islamica 7 (1957), 119. 
37 P.Heid.Arab. I n°10 = Abū Ṣafya n°32. See also P.Heid.Arab. I n°11 = Abū Ṣafya n°33. 
38 There were however exceptions to this rule in classical fiqh. For the Shāfiʿīs, the defendant’s appearance at 
court is not required (E. Tyan, “La procédure du “défaut”,” 118-9). Moreover, in Ḥanafī law, the plaintiff must 
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(2) The order of the procedure (appearance of both litigants → proof; or proof → appearance 
of the defendant) is not the main preoccupation of the governor. The assumption here is that the 
order of sentences in Qurra b. Sharīk’s letters do not reflect the precise steps to be followed by 
the pagarch. What then is the principal object? 
With only a few exceptions, the most recurring topic of Qurra’s judicial letters is the 
production of proof, called “bayyina”. This word (pl. bayyināt) occurs 71 times in the Qurʾān 
– 19 times in the singular, and 52 times in the plural.39 It always designates the “manifest 
proof”40, the “irrefutable proof”41 or the archetypal “Proof”42 produced by God of His existence 
and of the veracity of His prophets – e.g. the scriptural proof of the Qurʾān and its verses.43 In 
pre-classical and classical fiqh, “bayyina” came to designate the principal type of judicial proofs 
– the testimonial evidence of two (or four in case of fornication) reliable witnesses.44 However, 
although the Qurʾān mentions statements by two witnesses,45 it never refers to their testimony 
as “bayyina”. The word “bayyina” appears to signify “evidence” without referring to any 
specific procedure. 
Between the revelation or the collection of the Qurʾān around the middle of the seventh 
century CE and the composition of the first fiqh books a century later, an apparent 
terminological transformation occurred. At some point during this century, the word “bayyina” 
came to mean a “double reliable testimony regarded as evidence.” Qurra b. Sharīk’s letters, 
which were written halfway through this particular period, do not state the governor’s precise 
intention for employing this word. He only asks that the plaintiff “produces the proof of [his 
claim]” (aqāma l-bayyina ʿ alā mā akhbara-nī / aqāma ʿ alā dhālika l-bayyina). Was he referring 
to the testimony of two reliable witnesses? Or was he demanding for “irrefutable proofs”, 
irrespective of the precise nature of these proofs? 
A definitive answer to these questions cannot be supplied.46 Evidences found in papyri 
cannot be sufficiently substantiated, and later narrative sources are no better at elucidating the 
                                                        
produce witnesses and begin to prove his claim before the summoning of the defendant if the latter lives at a 
distance superior to half a day’s journey from the court. Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, ed. Farḥāt Ziyāda (Cairo: The 
American University in Cairo Press, 1978), 250. Cf. Ibn al-Qāṣṣ, Adab al-qāḍī, ed. Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī (Beirut: 
Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2007), 110. On this procedure, see M. Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq et l’État abbasside 
(132/750-334/945) (Damascus: Institut Français du Proche-Orient, 2009), 297-8. Could this procedure be a relic 
from the previous Umayyad procedure?  
39 M.F. ʿAbd al-Bāqī, al-Muʿjam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qurʾān al-karīm (Damascus-Beirut: Maktabat al-
Ghazālī-Muʾassasat manāhil al-ʿirfān, s.d.), 142-3. 
40 R. Brunschvig, “Le système de la preuve en droit musulman,” in Études d’islamologie (Paris: Maisonneuve 
et Larose, 1976), 202; id., “Bayyina,” in EI2, 1: 1150. 
41 cf. the French translation by Denise Masson in Essai d’interprétation du Coran inimitable (Beirut: Dār al-
kitāb al-lubnānī, s.d.), 78. 
42 Cf. the French translation by R. Blachère, Le Coran (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2005), 87. 
43 See al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-bayān fī taʾwīl al-Qurʾān, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-
risāla, 2000), 10: 242.  
44 R. Brunschvig, “Le système de la preuve,” 201 sq. 
45 Se e.g. Qurʾān, 5:106-7. 
46 We must remark that in P.Qurra n° 3 = Abū Ṣafya n°31, “bayyina” is used once in the singular and another 
time in the plural (bayyināt). The plural form of the word would not make sense if bayyina meant double (or 
multiple) testimony. We could therefore conclude that this plural simply means “evidences” in general. However, 
Abū Ṣafya prefers to read “shaʾna-hu” in lieu of “bayyināti-hi” (this reading is mentioned by Nabia Abbott in her 
edition of the papyrus); in such a case the plural form would hold no significance. 
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intentions of an Egyptian governor or what he expected from a Coptic pagarch. We can however 
formulate three premises: 
(1) Qurra b. Sharīk’s letters are the oldest documents using the word “bayyina” in a judicial 
sense. Whatever its precise meaning, the repetition of this word in the governor’s letters 
suggests that the “classical” judicial terminology was in the process of becoming fixed in the 
early eighth century CE, especially vocabulary pertaining to evidences. 
(2) The word “bayyina” clearly belongs to rhetoric based on the Qurʾān. Although “bayyina” 
may have been terminology used to designate judicial proofs before Islam, I have been unable 
to find any epigraphic or literary (i.e. poetical) evidence of such terminological use.47 Even if 
this were the case, the high number of occurrences of this word in the Qurʾān gave it 
undoubtedly a religious connotation. Other Arabic words could have been used to refer to 
“proof”, like ḥujja, dalīl, or burhān 48. These appear also in the Qurʾān (“ḥujja” is mentioned 
four times, “dalīl” once and “burḥān” eight times49), but to a much lesser extent than the word 
“bayyina”. Furthermore, they connote inferior types of proof relating to human reasoning or to 
bare arguments that can be refuted.50 In choosing the word “bayyina” which occupied a 
prominent position within the Qurʾān over other synonymous terminology, the governor was 
decidedly prescribing judicial procedures within a qurʾānic frame of reference.51 
(3) Given the central character of the word “bayyina” in Qurra b. Sharīk’s letters and its 
near-systematic appearance replete with religious connotations, the production of proofs could 
be one of the main reasons for the writing these letters. In other words, the governor of Fusṭāṭ 
may have required pagarchs to implement a procedure relying on specific mode of evidence, 
the bayyina, presumably as a kind of testimonial proof produced by a certain number of 
witnesses. 
 
Conditional judgement 
There is more to Qurra b. Sharīk’s letters than instructions concerning the appearance of  
litigants or prescribing judicial procedure such as the bayyina. The correspondence contains 
detailed instructions about verdicts. If the plaintiff succeeds in substantiating his claim by 
means of a bayyina, the pagarch is ordered to condemn the defendant. The verdict is a rational 
outcome in that the production of a proof leads to the sentencing. Despite their apparent 
banality, instructions regarding verdicts carry great significance. First, the existence of a verdict 
implies that the pagarch’s judgment is based on the bayyina. This is an indication that the 
                                                        
47 The term bayyina is absent from the vocabulary of the Muʿallaqāt compared to other terms relating to the 
law of evidence (shāhid, yamīn, ḥakam, ʿadl, khaṣm, qaḍā, ḥalafa, etc.) . See Albert Arazi and Salman Masalha, 
Six Early Arab Poets. New Edition and Concordance (Jerusalem: The Max Schloessinger Memorial Series, 1999), 
index. 
48 R. Brunschvig, “Bayyina,” in EI2, 1: 1150. 
49 M.F. ʿAbd al-Bāqī, al-Muʿjam al-mufahras, 118, 194, 261. 
50 The word “ḥujja” is associated with God in the Qurʾān (6:149), but the adjective “bāligha” (decisive) is 
required to instil the sense of “absolute proof”. See L. Gardet, ”Ḥudjdja,” in EI2, 3: 543. The word “dalīl” appears 
in the Qurʾān (25:45) meaning “guide”. As for “burḥān”, it is a more ambiguous word which can designate, in the 
Qurʾān, both decisive proof revealed by God and evidence men are asked to produce regarding the truthfulness of 
their beliefs. L. Gardet, “Burhān,” in EI2, 1: 1326. 
51 On similar examples of “qurʾānicization” of the discourse which occurred under the Umayyads, see F.M. 
Donner, “Qurʾānicization of Religio-Political Discourse in the Umayyad Period,” Revue des Mondes Musulmans 
et de la Méditerranée 129 (2011), 79-92. 
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bayyina prescribed by the governor was binding, and that the pagarch would only have issued 
a judgement on the basis of this proof. Second, the entire proceeding is executed as if the 
governor was himself issuing conditional judgment. He did not receive the litigants, nor record 
any proofs thereof, so could not have acted as a judge himself. Nevertheless, he dictated his 
verdict to the pagarch who fulfils this role on his behalf.  
That the governor is an important judicial authority is indicated in several of the letters, in 
sentences immediately preceding the final salutation. If the plaintiff cannot prove his claim, the 
governor orders the pagarch to inform this fact to him in writing (illā an yakūna shaʾnu-hu 
ghayra dhālika fa-taktubu ilayya bi-hi).52 At a first glance, Qurra b. Sharīk appears to be 
requesting to be kept abreast of a certain case,53 but this is not at all so. These instructions can 
only be understood if taken as part of a binary construction. If the plaintiff produces a bayyina, 
the pagarch must issue a judgment. On the other hand, if the plaintiff fails to prove his claim, 
the pagarch is required to write to the governor. In other words, the pagarch must not issue any 
judgment without the bayyina; he only has to consult the governor. What next? Will the 
governor issue new instructions on the basis of the pagarch’s report? Or will he impose another 
mode of proof (e.g. an oath, if we assume bayyina to be a double testimony)? Will he ask the 
defendant to produce evidence? Will he send new instructions to the pagarch regarding the 
verdict? There is nothing noteworthy in the Egyptian documents to answer these questions. 
What is clear, however, is that the governor of Fusṭāṭ constituted a significant part of the judicial 
authority delegated to the pagarch. 
 
3. Islamic referent in a Christian context: the role of the governor in a “provincial” 
procedure 
 
These pieces of information offer clues about the role of the governor and his administration 
within “provincial” legal proceedings – a procedure implemented outside Fusṭāṭ – and the 
judicial relationship between governors and Coptic authorities. Let us summarise the general 
flow of these proceedings. Individuals residing outside Fusṭāṭ raise their cases with the governor 
either by means of a direct petition or by seeking an audience with him. The governor writes to 
the pagarch of the plaintiff’s kūra a letter informing him of the plaintiff’s identity and the basis 
of the complaint, and orders him to judge the case. He prescribes a procedure that includes at 
one stage a confrontation between the litigants in addition to the production of specific 
evidence, called the bayyina, by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff produces a bayyina, the pagarch 
must issue a judgement restoring the disputed item to the plaintiff.54 Where such proof is not 
produced, the pagarch is obliged to write to the governor, possibly to seek new instructions. 
These letters suggest that governors had taken steps to centralise the Egyptian judiciary. In 
Qurra’s case, he wished to appear as guarantor of justice, as in the recurring formula “fa-lā 
                                                        
52 See references supra. 
53 This is for instance Steinwenter’s interpretation of the sentences. A. Steinwenter, Studien zu den koptischen 
Rechtsurkunden aus Oberäegypten (Amsterdam: Verlag Adof M. Hakkert, 1967 [1st ed. 1920]), 15. 
54 The governor’s instructions occasionally exceeded the level of bare restitution. In C.H. Becker, “Arabische 
Papyri des Aphroditofundes,” 74-75 = Abū Ṣafya n°34, Qurra b. Sharīk orders the pagarch to chase away “by 
force” (daḥran shadīdan) an illegal occupier of a house. Here restitution is associated with a kind of physical 
punishment of the defendant. 
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yuẓlamanna ʿinda-ka” (“Do not let [the plaintiff] be unjustly treated before you”).55 His role 
was not merely symbolic, however. Qurra also imposed procedures which, by their qurʾānic 
vocabulary, may have been identified as Islamic. Furthermore, he dictated his verdict to the 
pagarch or, at least, claimed higher judicial authority to whom the pagarch was accountable. In 
early eighth-century Upper Egypt, justice was still dispensed by Christian pagarchs. However, 
Qurra b. Sharīk’s letters indicate that these proceedings had been integrated into an Islamic 
framework.56 
It is not yet clear why Christian litigants referred their matters to the Muslim governor. Does 
this mean that these litigants did not refer them directly to their pagarch? Three hypotheses may 
be considered:  
(1) The plaintiff had already referred the matter to the pagarch. The pagarch issued a 
judgment but the plaintiff, unhappy with the outcome, chose to appeal the case with the 
governor. In Byzantine Egypt, appealing to the governor about decisions issued by local judges 
was a widespread practice.57 In her study of some Qurra papyri, Nabia Abbott seems to adhere 
to this interpretation of the procedure.58 Abbott’s hypothesis – that the governor acted as 
genuine appeal court against the pagarch’s decision – contradicts however with my previous 
assertion regarding the meaning of the expression “ghalaba ʿalā ḥaqqi-hi” (see supra). For the 
sake of discussion, let us consider nevertheless that my previous demonstration failed to prove 
the non-existence of any previous lawsuit before the pagarch, and that in reality the plaintiff 
appealed to the governor. This in no way implies that the governor presided over appeal 
proceedings; he did not personally receive the defendant but ordered the pagarch to conduct the 
trial and issue a judgment. Moreover, Qurra b. Sharīk’s letters do not mention any injustice 
committed by the pagarch, nor any reference to judgments quashed by the governor. What 
would the appeal be about, then? The centrality of the bayyina in these letters may offer a clue. 
One possibility may be that the plaintiff complained before the governor about a procedure 
implemented by the pagarch, in particular about certain proofs being used as basis of his 
judgment. This could explain why the governor ordered the pagarch to rely on specific proof, 
the bayyina. However this explanation does not fit with the minority of judicial papyri without 
any mention of the word “bayyina”.59 Here, the hypothesis that the governor-pagarch 
communications related to an appeal to the governor against a previous judgment falls short.  
(2) The plaintiff filed a complaint against his adversary before the pagarch of his district, but 
the pagarch failed to take up the case and the plaintiff decided to petition the matter directly 
with the governor. This implies that the plaintiff appealed to the governor against what he 
                                                        
55 See references above. 
56 The implementation of this procedure implicating  both a Muslim governor and Christian pagarchs makes it 
necessary to review some of Gladys Frantz-Murphy’s interpretations relying on the hypothesis of the 
disappearance of courts in late Byzantine Egypt. Frantz-Murphy considers the Muslim authorities as being 
responsible for the restoration of an efficient judicial system in Islamic Egypt (G. Frantz-Murphy, “Settlement of 
Property Disputes,” 101; she contradicts herself a few lines later, however, in 102, by suggesting that Coptic judges 
still existed in the second/eight century). The hypothesis of an extinction of courts in Byzantine Egypt before the 
Arab conquest has since then been refuted by D. Simon, cited by T. Gagos and P. van Minnen, Settling a Dispute. 
Toward a Legal Anthropology of Late Antique Egypt (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), 42. 
57 See G. Rouillard, L’administration civile de l’Égypte byzantine (Paris: Geuthner, 1928), 60. 
58 N. Abbott, The Ḳurra Papyri, 74, 99. 
59 See e.g. C.H. Becker, “Arabische Papyri des Aphroditofundes,” 74-75 = Abū Ṣafya n°34. 
M. Tillier, « Dispensing Justice in a Minority Context: the Judicial Administration of Upper Egypt under Muslim Rule in the Early Eighth 
Century », dans Robert G. Hoyland (éd.), The Late Antique World of Early Islam: Muslims among Jews and Christians in the East 
Mediterranean, Darwin Press, Princeton, 2015, p. 133-156. 
 
12 
 
regarded as an abuse of power, as suggested by Steinwenter’s interpretation.60 However Qurra 
b. Sharīk’s judicial letters do not mention the pagarch rejecting a previously filed complaint. In 
a Greek letter to Basilios, Qurra reproaches him for his lack of attention to the needs of the 
people, and he enjoins him to be more just.61 According to J. Abū Ṣafya, this letter rebukes the 
pagarch’s judicial practice, stating that Basilios neither heard the complaints of his people nor 
judged them accordingly. 62 Abū Ṣafya’s interpretation is questionable, however, since the letter 
in question concerns mainly taxes and fiscal abuses committed by tax collectors. It is true that 
Qurra b. Sharīk urges Basilios to be more “just” and listen carefully to the complaints of his 
people, but the justice at stake here is a fiscal one, not one between private litigants. Appeals to 
the dux of Thebaide – or even to the Byzantine emperor himself – against judicial abuses 
committed by the pagarch of Aphroditō or his employees were commonplace during the sixth 
century CE.63 Under the Umayyads, however, no serious evidence allows us to conclude that 
appeals to governors arose from the denial of justice. Furthermore, the standardised form of 
judicial letters and their frequency – Qurra b. Sharīk’s letters were written during a period of a 
little more than one year – do not suggest that they were related to occasional abuses, but written 
as part of a more standard procedure. 
(3) Either the plaintiff had not filed a complaint with the pagarch, or the claim was filed and 
the pagarch immediately dispatched him to the governor of Fusṭāṭ. This means that the 
complaint before the governor was part of the first instance procedure. According to this 
procedure, a plaintiff living far from Fusṭāṭ referred his case to the governor or his 
administration. The case was then referred to the pagarch in a letter prescribing the judicial 
procedure including conditional judgment. If this scenario is true, the governor’s letter was a 
precondition to the examination of a dispute by the pagarch. This hypothesis, which appears as 
the most plausible, suggests that the governor not only was informed of the pagarchies’ legal 
matters but exercised actual authority over them.  
This scenario is strongly comparable to certain procedures dating from late Antiquity. From 
the fourth century CE onward, local judges of the Roman Empire could only adjudicate minor 
litigations concerning small amounts of money; major cases had to be referred to the governor. 
64 Moreover, Constantin Zuckerman noticed the importance of a procedure by rescripts in sixth-
century Egypt. A plaintiff sent a petition to the Emperor in the first instance, in which he 
explained his case. The Emperor – or rather his administration – sent a rescript to the dux of 
Thebaide, in which he ordered him to hear the complaint and to dispense a judgment in favour 
of the plaintiff. These rescripts were enforceable only after the dux had conducted a proper trial, 
in the presence of both litigants, and after the facts mentioned by the plaintiff in his petition had 
been verified.65 Jill Harries also notes that from the fifth century onward a specific procedure 
                                                        
60 A. Steinwenter, Studien zu den koptischen Rechtsurkunden, 15. 
61 Papyrus n°1356, translated into English by H.I. Bell, “Translations of the Greek Aphrodito Papyri in the 
British Museum, Part 1,” Der Islam 2 (1911), 281-2; Arabic translation by J. Abū Ṣafya, Bardiyyāt Qurra, 229-
30. 
62 J. Abū Ṣafya, Bardiyyāt Qurra, 109. 
63 H.I. Bell, “An Egyptian Village in the Age of Justinian,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 64 (1944), 31, 33, 
35.  
64 J. Harries, Law and Empire in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 54. 
65 C. Zuckerman, “Les deux Dioscore d’Aphroditè ou les limites de la pétition,” in Denis Feissel and Jean 
Gascou, eds., La pétition à Byzance (Paris: Centre d’Histoire et Civilisation de Byzance, 2004), 83-84. Cf. H.I. 
M. Tillier, « Dispensing Justice in a Minority Context: the Judicial Administration of Upper Egypt under Muslim Rule in the Early Eighth 
Century », dans Robert G. Hoyland (éd.), The Late Antique World of Early Islam: Muslims among Jews and Christians in the East 
Mediterranean, Darwin Press, Princeton, 2015, p. 133-156. 
 
13 
 
developed in which a petitioner addressed the office of the governor through a libellus in which 
the plaintiff described his adversary and the dispute.66 The rescript issued by the governor did 
not judge the truthfulness of the facts, but rather exposed a rule pertinent to the case and 
authorised the plaintiff to refer his dispute before a judge (iudex).67 The governor could send 
the rescript to the claimant or directly to the local officer in charge of adjudicating similar 
disputes.68 
The similarity between the procedure by rescript in Byzantine Egypt and the procedure 
revealed by Qurra b. Sharīk’s letters is striking. It is thus tempting to conclude that early eighth-
century Egyptian judicial administration originated in part from late Roman-Byzantine 
procedures. It appears as if the libelli previously sent to Constantinople, or increasingly to the 
dux, were still in use at Aphroditō under early Islamic rule. Like the Emperor or the dux, the 
governor of Fusṭāṭ sent rescripts – i.e. surviving judicial letters – to pagarchs whenever he 
received a complaint. These rescripts prescribed the procedure to be followed and issued 
conditional judgments.  
Does this indicate that the procedure was complied with systematically and that the 
proceedings could only be opened once the plaintiff had sent a petition to the governor? This is 
certainly not the case. The people of Aphroditō could still go directly to the pagarch’s court, as 
had been the case in the late seventh century CE.69 The high sums mentioned in Qurra’s letters 
suggest that only the most expensive disputes were referred to the governor, and that cases 
involving insignificant sums were referred to pagarchs without the matter being raised before 
the governor. Does this mean that litigations about large sums of money had to be referred to 
the governor’s administration and that judgements could only be issued subsequent to the 
governor’s authorisations and instructions? In other words, did the governors of Fusṭāṭ impose 
such procedure by rescripts? It is possible that at first, the Coptic people simply kept their 
former habit of sending petitions to their rulers – the dux, or the governor, whatever his religion 
– to ensure their disputes would merit more scrutiny by the pagarch,70 especially in case high-
value disputes. If this last hypothesis is true, the governors of Fusṭāṭ adopted this procedure as 
a way of dealing with constant inflow of new petitions. Even if they did not impose it – or not 
at first –, this procedure allowed the governors to establish control over  a provincial, Christian 
judicial institution and to develop or promote “Islamic”71 procedures that eventually evolved 
into the classical model theorised by fiqh books a century later. 
 
                                                        
Bell, “An Egyptian Village,” 26. See also J. Harries, Law and Empire in Late Antiquity, 184; T. Gagos and P. van 
Minnen, Settling a Dispute, 10-15 (however, this last example of petition is not judicial in nature). 
66 About the Roman concept of libellus, see A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia: 
The American Philosophical Society, 1954), 561. 
67 J. Harries, Law and Empire, 27, 104-105. 
68 C. Humfress, Orthodoxy and the Courts, p. 42. However Arthur Schiller questions the classification of 
“rescript” of most Egyptian Byzantine papyri which are usually identified as such. A. Schiller, “The Courts are 
No More,” in Studi in onore di Edoardo Volterra (Casa editrice dott. A. Giuffrè, 1971), 1: 477-82. 
69 See for example P.Apoll. no37. 
70 See G. Frantz-Murphy, “Settlement of Property Disputes in Provincial Egypt: the Reinstitution of Courts in 
the Early Islamic Period,” al-Masāq 6 (1993), 103. 
71 By “Islamic”, I simply mean that these procedures were being enacted by Muslim governors within a qurʾānic 
conceptual framework. For lack of evidence and details about the procedure prescribed by governors, it is however 
difficult to comment further on their provenance. 
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Conclusion 
The exact nature of judicial procedures implemented by the governor of Fusṭāṭ remains 
uncertain until more evidence is discovered. Among the various hypotheses described above, 
some seem more consistent than others. It is likely that raising the case first and foremost with 
the governor was a normal judicial procedure in the Christian landscape, one that adhered to 
the format of previous Byzantine procedures.  
This by no means undermines the originality of the process which led to the development of 
classical Islamic procedures. By adopting a judicial procedure in which Christian litigants 
referred to him as first port of call (probably by way of petitions), Egyptian governors like Qurra 
b. Sharīk could gain control over local judicial practices. Although he did not dispense justice 
himself amongst the Christian people of Upper Egypt, the governor could also impose rules of 
procedures, or at least reinterpret them within an Islamic framework characterised by the use 
of a qurʾānic terminology.  
This suggests that the judicial system served the Muslims to increase their authority within 
the Egyptian landscape. Earlier documentary evidence demonstrates that the Christian dux was 
still regarded as superior judicial authority under the Sufyānids (second half of the seventh 
century)72 and that he could send his judicial instructions to the pagarch. Institutionally 
speaking, the Egyptian landscape therefore remained only loosely connected to the Muslim 
rule. In the early eighth century, however, the governor of Fusṭāṭ emerged as the highest legal 
authority within the province. Even though disputes were still being adjudicated by Christian 
pagarchs, the development of a judicial hierarchy presided over by the Muslim governor 
integrated the traditional institutions of conflict resolution into a more structured state. The 
emergence of a new judicial order appears to have undermined the rule of Christian authorities 
and eventually led to their disappearance. By regularly submitting their complaints to the 
governor of Fusṭāṭ, Christians became accustomed to the main principles of an “Islamic” justice 
as guaranteed by Muslim authorities. Once this process was achieved one or two decades later, 
the governor of Fusṭāṭ successfully replaced traditional pagarchs with Muslim sub-governors.73 
Christian judicial institutions became marginalised and mainly survived within episcopal 
courts. Thus, despite remaining a majority for centuries, the Christian populace became a 
submissive minority at least on an institutional level.  
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